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Abstract

Achieving secure, high performance implementations for constrained applications
such as implantable and wearable medical devices is a priority in efficient block
ciphers. However, security of these algorithms is not guaranteed in presence of malicious and natural faults. Recently, a new lightweight block cipher, Midori, has been
proposed which optimizes the energy consumption besides having low latency and
hardware complexity. This algorithm is proposed in two energy-efficient varients,
i.e., Midori64 and Midori128, with block sizes equal to 64 and 128 bits. In this thesis, fault diagnosis schemes for variants of Midori are proposed. To the best of the
our knowledge, there has been no fault diagnosis scheme presented in the literature
for Midori to date. The fault diagnosis schemes are provided for the nonlinear S-box
layer and for the round structures with both 64-bit and 128-bit Midori symmetric
key ciphers. The proposed schemes are benchmarked on field-programmable gate
array (FPGA) and their error coverage is assessed with fault-injection simulations.
These proposed error detection architectures make the implementations of this new
low-energy lightweight block cipher more reliable.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview of Cryptography
Regardless of the situation and applications, for many years, information security
has played a generally crucial role in transmission and different forms of conveyance
of information. Cryptography uses secure methods, e.g., utilizing block ciphers (for
encryption) and hash function (for integrity checking), to boost information security
against the presence of third parties through data transmission. Updated and various cryptographic mechanisms such as the recent post-quantum algorithms can be
applied to increase the security level of embedded systems. Several requirements for
information security should be considered in the utilized protocols and mechanisms
of communication systems, such as data integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation,
validation, timestamping, and authentication. Conceptually, the goals of cryptography, including data integrity, confidentiality, and authentication, have not changed
dramatically over time and researchers have spent many years ameliorating them using different and efficient approaches [1]-[2]. However, designing new algorithms and
applying various techniques do not completely guarantee the information security
in the present electronic security.
The data integrity goal provides the unauthorized alteration of data which be possi-
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ble by detecting data manipulation such as insertion and substitution. Confidentiality gives the service of encryption and decryption to make a secure information as
well as authentication makes the identification service for the content of information.
In addition, non-repudiation is also important due to preventing components from
denying previous commitments or actions through the data transmission progress
[1].

cryptology

cryptography

Symmetric
Ciphers

Asymmetric
Ciphers

cryptanalysis

Protocols

Stream
Ciphers

Block
Ciphers

Lightweight
Block Cipher

Figure 1.1: The classification of cryptology.

To meet all of the aforementioned necessary goals, cryptography science is divided
into various parts: Fig. 1.1 depicts the main cryptographic primitives. As shown
in Fig. 1.1, cryptology more generally consists of cryptography for designers who
make security for safe data transmitting, and the latter part, cryptanalysis, gives a
chance to ill-intentioned people to break the security provided by cryptographers.
However, we will focus on cryptography, which splits into three branches: symmetric
ciphers, asymmetric ciphers, and protocols. Symmetric algorithms such as the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) use the
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inverse operation with the same key for encryption and decryption of the data to
perform a secure communication. This key must be transmitted by a secure channel
among senders and receivers. On the other hand, in the asymmetric ciphers or public
key algorithms, there are two keys: one is a symmetric ciphers key (secret key), and
the other is used just for authentication of the sender or receiver (public key). As
indicated by their name, public keys are published in the public sphere, such as on
the internet, while the private key is unique for each side of communication and
it is infeasible to obtain the private key from the encrypt or decrypt function or
the public key. The third branch of cryptography is protocols that apply various
algorithms of the symmetric and asymmetric ciphers to develop applications such
as security of internet communication or Transport Layer Security (TLS) schemes
in web browsers [2]-[3].
This thesis focuses on symmetric cryptography in the form of lightweight block
ciphers. In detail, a novel lightweight block cipher, Midori, uses the same key for
encryption and decryption as a symmetric cipher with the block of inputs/outputs,
and keys in the form of a block cipher. This block cipher counts as a lightweight
one, discussed in the following section 1.2.

1.2 Lightweight Cryptography
Lightweight cryptography has had an essential role in achieving high security with
low area and low energy consumption in many sensitive applications, such as secure
embedded systems, wireless nano-sensors, radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags,
and implantable and wearable medical devices. Such efficiency is more critical in
energy-constrained applications such as implantable medical devices, in which re-

3

Chapter 1

Introduction

placing discharged batteries with power-inefficient architectures is a burden due to
the required surgeries to do so [4]. In addition, tiny computing devices such as RFID
tags and sensors need efficient block ciphers because of their small area and limited
source power [5].
In these sensitive devices, low energy consumption is among the most significant concerns – especially with the advent of the Internet of Things, in which, through multichannel connectivity, data are exchanged in embedded systems [6]. This challenge
is answered by lightweight block ciphers, which provide a high level of security, low
energy consumption, and low hardware complexity, such as PRESENT [7], CLEFIA
[8], PRINCE [9], SIMON and SPECK [10], and LED [11]. The presented lightweight
block ciphers are solutions to reach reasonable confidentiality with low area in different networks, e.g., Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) that have no physical
layer security [12]. It is noted that AES is the current symmetric key cryptography standard in encryption and decryption operations which has been optimized in
terms of area and power consumption [13]. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, prominent
efforts have been made to considerably reduce area and power through AES, e.g.,
2400 gate equivalent for 128-bit AES [6]; the optimized AES has still large overheads
in terms of area and power consumption for highly-constrained environments.
Standardization of lightweight block ciphers has been a concern of designers and
consumers, and there are no specific criteria for lightweight designers. However,
several standards such as ISO 29192-2 specify two lightweight block ciphers, CLEFIA
and PRESENT [7]-[8]. The first one is a Feistel-cipher with 128-bit structure and can
provide a high security level along with good hardware and software implementation
capabilities, such as high-speed performance on a wide range of processors. On the
other hand, PRESENT has a substitution-permutation network (SPN) structure
and has more optimized performance than AES. This lightweight cipher applies 4-

4

1.3 Fault Diagnosis
bit S-boxes as a compact design to create low power consumption and high efficiency.
Efficiency of lightweight block ciphers is dependent on many metrics, such as area,
latency, power, and energy; indeed, power and energy consumption are correlated
metrics, but energy is a more relevant metric to determine a productive design than
the latter is [14]-[17]. Having high confidentiality without adding overhead in
terms of energy consumption and hardware complexity is the reason to design new
and more efficient lightweight symmetric key block ciphers like Midori.
From the view of energy consumption, the Midori variants have a round base architecture and use less energy than 1.89 pJ/bit encrypted, which is far better than
other lightweight block ciphers such as PRINCE and NOEKEON [9, 14, 18]. In
other words, Midori provides an acceptable security level with more optimal energy consumption in comparison to previous lightweight symmetric ciphers . The
S-boxes of Midori are different from those of the AES and other lightweight block
ciphers. Furthermore, Midori has two types of bijective 4-bit S-boxes, which are
more energy-efficient than 8-bit ones. It is noted that Midori, like other lightweight
block ciphers, accepts optimal cell-permutation matrices and uses the most efficient
maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices due to low implementation overheads
and increasing immunity against several attacks [14].

1.3 Fault Diagnosis
It has been shown in the state-of-the-art that a large number of side-channels
through data transmission provide information that reveals important and compromising details about secret data. Some of these details can be used as new trapdoors
to invert a trapdoor one-way function without the secret key. This allows an adversary to break a cryptographic protocol, even if it proved to be secure in the classical,
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mathematical sense. The various side-channels include timing measurements, power
consumption, sound, electromagnetic emissions, and faults [19].
A fault induced into a system causes a defect while running a program in which the
adversary is able to observe the reaction and break the system. Unlike other side
channel attacks, which are passive, fault attacks are active ones, where an adversary
must tamper with an attacked device to create faults. Depending on the type of
physical stress applied, faults may show effects of different duration. As a result, we
differentiate between transient faults, permanent faults, and destructive faults.
A destructive fault occurs if an adversary destroys a physical structure on the chip,
which causes a certain bit or variable to be fixed at a specific value for all successive
runs of the device. Destructive faults cannot be reversed. Permanent and transient
faults, called solid (hard) faults and soft faults, respectively, are both faults that
do not modify the hardware of an attacked device, thus allowing it to recover from
the induced faults after a certain period of time [19]. Permanent faults change an
affected variable until that variable is explicitly overwritten, e.g., by a reset at the
start of the next run, whereas temporary faults are only short-lived, such that after
a given amount of time, the effect ceases to exist and the correct value is present
again.
These soft faults are classified as intermittent when they develop into a permanent
fault, or transient when they are caused by some external disturbance such as power
supply fluctuations. In addition, they are categorized as parametric or logical in
terms of fault effect. The first type of fault makes changes through speed, voltage,
or current as it alters the circuit parameter magnitude, whereas logical faults make
changes in the Boolean function through the circuit. One kind of significant faults
through embedded systems is known as a delay fault, which is caused by slow gates
and is an effective parametric fault through embedded systems. This kind of fault
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can cause problems of critical races. These faults can be either local or distributed.
A distributed fault, such as a clock malfunction, affects multiple variables, whereas
a local fault affects a single variable. Consequently, increasing the number of components on a single chip because of VLSI developments has led to an increase in fault
occurrence probability through different embedded systems. Thus, fault attacks and
different types and countermeasures against them are the focus of many studies, as
is described in the following.

1.3.1 Type of Faults

As mentioned above, logical faults are a significant type of fault that represent the
behavior of the system modeled. Logical faults consist of three important classes.
A) Stuck-at-faults: A single stuck-at-fault happens when either one of the inputs
or the outputs of the logic gate is fixed at either a logic 1 (stuck-at-1) or a logic 0
(stuck-at-0). They can be denoted by the abbreviations s-a-1 and s-a-0, respectively.
This fault model is a good representation of types of defects, such as open circuits and
short circuits. In practice, stuck-at faults are usually considered to be destructive
faults, where it is assumed that a destroyed wire, gate, or memory cell will cause the
faulty bit to be stuck at the value 0. Moreover, the stuck-at model can represent
multiple faults that result when multiple signal lines are stuck at logic 0 or logic 1.
B) Bridging faults: Bridging faults occur when two or more signal lines are
accidentally connected together, depending on the logic circuitry employed. They
can be classified as follows.
i) Input Bridging: This bridging fault happens when a definite number of primary
input lines are shorted. It can form wired logic or a voting model.
ii) Feedback Bridging: This type of fault can introduce a feedback with existing
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a short circuit between an input and an output line. The fault causes the circuit
to either oscillate or latch (additional memory). It is noted that this may happen
between two or more signal lines or between the terminals of the transistor. In
CMOS circuits, depending on the bridging resistance and the physical location,
faults can manifest as either stuck-open or stuck-at faults.
iii) Non-feedback Bridging: Apart from the above two, all other remaining types of
existing bridging faults are in this non-feedback fault group. If two lines happen to
be physically close to each other, the probability of them being bridged is higher.
In a positive logic, a bridging fault is assumed to behave as wired-AND with the
dominant logic value being 0. In a negative logic, a bridging fault is assumed to
behave as wired-OR with the dominant value being 1.
C) Delay Faults: Because of statistical variations in manufacturing processes,
there is an increased probability of the appearance of smaller defects that cause a
circuit to be partially short or open circuit. Due to these defects, the circuit fails to
meet the timing specifications without altering its logic function. The transition of
the signal might be delayed from 1 to 0 or vice versa due to a small defect. This is
called a delay fault. They are of two types of delay faults.
i) Gate Delay Fault: This fault helps in modeling defects that cause the propagation
delay of the faulty gate to exceed the worst-case value specified. It can be used to
model isolated defects but not distributed defects.
ii) Path Delay Fault: This fault can be used to model both isolated and distributed
defects. It occurs when the propagation delay exceeds its specified limit along a
circuit path.
D) Transition and Intermittent Faults: These faults can be classified as temporary faults. The majority of the malfunctioning in digital circuits results from
temporary faults, and these are also difficult to detect and isolate. Transient faults
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are the non-recurring temporary faults that occur due to the fluctuations of the
power supply or the circuit exposure to some external radiation, such as α-particle
radiation. As there is no physical damage to the hardware, these faults cannot be
repaired and thus are a major source of failures. Intermittent faults are due to poor
designs, loose connections, or components that are partially defective. They happen
because of the deteriorating or aging of the components, and because of external
environmental conditions such as vibration, humidity, temperature, etc. Intermittent faults are based on the protection of the system from the physical environment
through cooling, filtering, shielding, etc.

1.3.2 Fault Degradation

In digital systems, errors can happen through various causes including alpha particles from package decay, cosmic rays creating energetic neutrons and protons, and
thermal neutrons. In advanced process technologies, errors can occur due to device
shrinking, reduced power supply voltages, and higher operating frequencies which
increase the probability of transient errors which can significantly affect reliability
of computations. In addition, single event upsets and single event transients are
generated due to cosmic rays which create energetic protons and neutrons, thermal
neutrons, random noise, or signal integrity problems all resulting in device errors.
Degradation in digital circuits can happen in many ways such as:

• Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown causes the leakage current affecting the
transistor gates to increase, it results in short circuit.
• The phenomenon of Electromigration causes the metal ions to migrate thus
leading to voids and holes in interconnect. These can cause open or short
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circuits which can cause faults.
• The Hot-carrier effect (HCE) can cause the threshold voltage in CMOS transistors to increase and also results in the degradation of electron mobility.

1.3.3 Fault Detection Techniques

The process of determining whether the circuit contains a fault or not is called fault
detection [20]. As it is important to counteract such natural faults in order to achieve
fault immunity and reliability, error detection has been an important part of a
number of hardware architectures in different domains, including various arithmetic
unit sub-components [21]. In previous work, reliable architectures have been devised
to counteract natural or malicious faults, e.g., cryptographic architectures immune
to faults through concurrent error detection [22]. Different fault detection strategies
can be classified as follows:
A) Concurrent Error Detection: This mechanism helps in detecting the faults
in the circuit concurrently with the normal operation of the circuit by making use of
additional logic. It results in an error if the resulting output is found different than
the predicted output by the checker unit [23]. The error coverage can be improved
greatly using the methods of duplication or including parity check registers in the
circuit. For improving the error coverage, the trade-off with area or latency, or
throughput can be made. The errors can be also detected by running the circuit
twice, once with the original operands and the second time using encoded operands
such that different outputs are obtained. The checker will raise the error indication
flag in case of a mismatch between the two outputs. The operands can be encoded
using different methods [24].
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B) Off-Line Fault Detection: This method helps in identifying faults in FPGAs
and ASICs when they are not in operation with the use of additional circuitry.
It helps in detecting manufacturing defects. Automated-Test-Pattern-Generator
(ATPG) and Built-in-Self-Test (BIST) are some examples of off-line test circuits.
The fault detection process does not involve the original circuitry. It connects the
device under test between a pattern generator and an output response analyzer.
In order to obtain full error coverage, it is important to check the logic and interconnects and the configuration network. For the FPGAs [25], the need of a large
number of test configurations has been eliminated as the additional testing circuitry
is built into the development boards by most of the recent consumer grade FPGAs
[26]. BIST does not interfere with the normal FPGA operation, and also covers
clock networks and PLLs which are complicated systems.
C) Roving Fault Detection: This method helps in pointing out the faulty location
in the FPGA circuit. It checks for defects in the FPGA by scanning it entirely and
replaces those defects with a test function. It basically helps in adapting the BIST
techniques with minimum increase in the area. In the roving detection, the entire
FPGA is split equally into a number of regions where one region carries out the
BIST testing while the others undergo normal operations. The speed of the roving
method depends on the speed of the roving cycle as well as on the operation time.
It has been reported that the latency of the best roving methods is less than one
second.
In this thesis, we focus on error detection in crypto-architectures that has been the
center of attention in many previous works. Concurrent error detection techniques
have been widely used to architect reliable hardware for the AES and other cryptographic algorithms [27]-[34]. It is well-known that concurrent error detection
techniques include a number of schemes, i.e., hardware, information,
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time, hybrid redundancy. Hardware redundancy makes use of extra hardware to
process the same input twice to match the two outputs; any mismatch will trigger
the error flag. Information redundancy schemes have a number of variants, e.g., parity codes [35] and robust codes [36]. Time redundancy technique has a number of
schemes, i.e., recomputing with shifted operands (RESO) [37]-[38], recomputing
with rotated operands (RERO) [39], and recomputing with permuted operands
(REPO) [40]. The hybrid redundancy scheme is given in [41]-[43] where different
improve-ments in the architecture have been proposed. The choice of the error
detection technique is completely dependent on the requirements in terms of
overhead toler-ance, security, and reliability. In the case of Midori, to the best of the
our knowledge, there is no prior work. The merit of the proposed approaches in this
thesis compared to the approaches presented before for lightweight block ciphers is
two-fold. First, we present both logic-gate based and look-up table based error
detection schemes for the two types of the S-boxes in Midori which gives freedom to
the designers to choose the implementation strategy based on the implementation
and performance metrics requirements and the platform to implement. Second, for
the MixColumn operation, we have examined to achieve have low-overhead detection
approaches, by performing design space explorations before-math not as an
afterthought.

Such careful

investigations

to

have

a

combined

original

implementation and error detection architecture has not been performed in previous
state-of-the-art.

1.4 Objectives

Through this thesis and for the new lightweight block cipher Midori, we propose
error detection schemes with the reasonable area and power consumption overheads
for the highly-constrained applications. To the best of our knowledge, research on
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developing reliable architectures for Midori have not been reported to date.
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:

• We propose signature-based schemes for the linear and nonlinear blocks of
Midori.

– For the S-boxes within Midori, we derive and implement both look-up table (LUT) and logic gate S-boxes and we propose fault diagnosis schemes
that can be tailored based on the reliability and overheard objectives.
This gives the designers freedom in designing the S-boxes based on available resources and performance to achieve.
– For the non-linear blocks, we present fault diagnosis schemes which are
tailored towards design-for-low-overhead fault detection. The MixColumn operation has been examined to achieve a number of schemes and
the selection of the matrices within has been carefully done to have lowoverhead detection approaches.

• The performed simulation results show high error coverage for the presented
schemes. Using the proposed approaches, the error detection structures are
capable of detecting the injected faults with high coverage (transient and permanent as well as single, multiple, and adjacent faults).
• Through FPGA implementations using Xilinx Virtex-7 family, it is shown
that the overheads of the proposed architectures are acceptable for resourceconstrained applications.
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1.5 Thesis Outline
In this thesis, we present the error detection constructions of Midori through the
following chapters:

• Chapter 2: This chapter explains the brief preliminary of the Midori variants
architectures.
• Chapter 3: Through this chapter, our proposed fault detection schemes for
Midori are presented.
• Chapter 4: This chapter provides the results of fault injected simulations
which determine the capability of our proposed schemes during different faults.
Moreover, some of these schemes are implemented on FPGA.
• Chapter 5: This chapter finalizes the thesis by discussing our future scope in
this area and summarizing the mentioned research work.

14

2 Preliminaries
2.1 Midori
Midori consists of two parts, i.e., data processing and key scheduling modules. The
plaintext input and the ciphertext output, which are 64 bits or 128 bits in width,
are divided to 4-bit and 8-bit cells, respectively. This is also performed for the
whitening key (W K) and round keys (RKi ). The round keys are used as input to
the main functions of the algorithm, and the whitening keys are modulo-2 added
with input and output of the entire encryption or decryption operation. Two variants
of Midori, Midori64 and Midori128, are 64-bit block cipher and 128-bit block cipher
with the same key length of 128 bits corresponding to 16 and 20 number of rounds,
respectively.
The Midori that is based on the SPN structure as shown in Fig. 2.1, uses the
following 4 × 4 array state [14]:





s0


s
 1
S=

s
 2



s4
s5

s8
s9

s6 s10

s12 



s13 

,

s14 




(2.1)

s3 s7 s11 s15

in which the size of each cell is 4 bits and 8 bits for Midori64 and Midori128,
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respectively. Midori applies bijective S-boxes, Sb0 and Sb1 , with 4-bit structure
and involution property which are used in Midori64 and Midori128, respectively.
Midori128 utilizes four different 8-bit S-boxes, SSb0 , SSb1 , SSb2 , SSb3 . Each of
these 8-bit S-boxes consists of two 4-bit Sb1 with permutation input and output
structures which are described as shown in Fig. 2.1 and in more details in [14].
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Figure 2.1: Midori lightweight block cipher diagram.
Moreover, Table 3.1 (in the next chapter) represents the structure of bijective Sboxes Sb0 and Sb1 that constitute the S-layers to perform round functions. The
S-boxes are utilized in each round functions and apply the following four operations
to the state matrix:
• SubCell (S): The 4-bit and 8-bit S-boxes are used for each element of the state
S in Midori64 and Midori128 in parallel. We have si ← Sb0 [si ] for Midori64
and si ← SSb(imod4) [si ] for Midori128, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
• ShuffleCell (S): Each byte of the state is derived as follows:

(s0 , s1 , ..., s15 ) ←(s0 , s10 , s5 , s15 , s14 , s4 , s11 , s1 , s9 , s3 , s12 , s6 , s7 , s13 , s2 , s8 ).
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• MixColumn (S): Midori utilizes an involutive binary matrix M , applied to
every 4m-bit column of the state S, i.e., (si ,si+1 ,si+2 , si+3 )T ← M ×(si , si+1 ,
si+2 , si+3 )T and i = 0, 4, 8, 12.
• KeyAdd (S, RKi ): The i-th n-bit round key RKi is modulo-2 added to the
state S.

Before the first round, an additional KeyAdd operation is applied, and in the last
round, the ShuffleCell and MixColumn operations are omitted. The data processing part of the Midori consists of its encryption and decryption that perform the
mentioned round function for specific number of rounds except the last round. The
decryption is performed through the same sequence of mentioned round function
with a difference of the added InvShuffleCell.
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3 Proposed Reliable Architectures
for Midori

In this chapter, the error detection approaches of subblocks in the Midori encryption
and decryption are proposed.

3.1 Proposed Approaches for the S-boxes Variants
In the hardware implementations of Midori, two approaches can be used for realizing
the S-boxes, i.e., LUT-based and logic gate-based implementations. The LUT-based
S-boxes have advantages such as good performance and disadvantages such as having
high area and power consumption. On the other hand, the latter approach typically
has less area and power consumption [14].
Our proposed signature-based error detection approach is not confined to a special
signature. However, for the sake of clarity, we present two examples, i.e., paritybased and interleaved parity-based approaches.
We can store predicted parities (or interleaved parities) of elements from the S array
in LUTs. The scheme for the S-box Sb0 and Sb1 is based on deriving the predicted
parities of the S-boxes using LUTs as shown in Table 3.1. For each element of
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S-boxes, we modulo-2 add all bits. Then, we store the result as parity bit in an
extended LUT with five-bit elements (note that one extra bit is added to each 4-bit
entry). Thus, the new, protected state would consist of 16 five-bit elements which
can be stored in FPGA block memories or pipelined distributed LUTs. An example
would be to derive the parity of the first element of Sb0 which is {c}16 = {1100}2
which is zero.
The other signature-based error detection scheme is based on interleaved parity bits
that is proposed in order to protect the non-linear S-boxes. Interleaved paritybased schemes are able to detect burst faults, i.e., adjacent multiple faults. Such
faults happen in both natural defects and malicious fault attacks. In this scheme,
we compute the interleaved parity bits for 4-bit bijective S-boxes Sb0 and Sb1 in
hexadecimal form as shown in Table 3.1. We have derived such parities by modulo2 addition of odd bits and even bits with each other separately. Similarly, these
2-bit interleaved parities along with 4-bit elements of each state are stored as 6-bit
elements in memories. An example would be to derive the interleaved parity of the
first element of Sb0 which is {c}16 = {1100}2 which is 11 (modulo-2 adding the odd
and even bits separately).
Table 3.1: Interleaved parity and parity of 4-bit bijective S-boxes Sb0 and Sb1 in
hexadecimal form
x

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Sb0

C (11,0)

A (00,0)

D (10,1)

3 (11,0)

E (01,1)

B (01,1)

F (00,0)

7 (10,1)

Sb1

1 (01,1)

0 (00,0)

5 (00,0)

3 (11,0)

E (01,1)

2 (10,1)

F (00,0)

7 (10,1)

x

8

9

A

B

C

D

E

F

Sb0

8 (10,1)

9 (11,0)

1 (01,1)

5 (00,0)

0 (00,0)

2 (10,1)

4 (01,1)

6 (11,0)

Sb1

D (10,1)

A (00,0)

9 (11,0)

B (01,1)

C (11,0)

8 (10,1)

4 (01,1)

6 (11,0)

We have also derived the formula for logic-based implementations of the two S-boxes
Sb0 and Sb1 , respectively. Suppose the inputs to the S-boxes are a, b, c, d and the
4-bit outputs are a0 , b0 , c0 , d0 .
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3.1 Proposed Approaches for the S-boxes Variants
For Sb0 , we have derived as following:
¯
¯ b0 = dā∨bc∨acd,
¯
a0 = c̄ā∨ c̄b̄∨ād,
c0 = bd∨āb∨ād, d0 = c(ā∨ b)∨d(āb∨a
b̄). (3.1)
Furthermore, for Sb1 , where ∨ represents an OR gate, we have:
¯ b0 = adc̄∨bc∨
¯
¯ ādc,
¯ c0 = cd∨ b̄ad∨ āb, d0 = cā∨cb̄∨ b̄d.
¯ (3.2)
a0 = ac̄∨ab̄∨ ādb,
db∨
We would like to emphasize that other possible signatures can be also utilized. Here
are two examples for parity-based and interleaved parity-based approaches.
The following equations show the predicted parity formulations for the two S-boxes
Sb0 and Sb1 , respectively. We have denoted the predicted parities in these formulations by a “hat” sign, i.e., P̂ ,
¯
¯
¯ d)∨ā(bd∨
¯
¯
¯ (3.3)
P̂Sb0 = dac∨bāc̄∨
b̄d(c∨a)∨db(ā∨c̄),
P̂Sb1 = b̄(acd∨c̄d∨ā
dc̄)∨abc
d.
For the interleaved parity-based scheme, we have derived the parities for odd bits
and even bits in each of the S-boxes. For Sb0 and Sb1 , we have:
(0)
¯ ∨ d(cb ∨ ac̄), P̂ (1) = āc̄(b ∨ d)
¯ ∨ b̄d(āc ∨ ac̄) ∨ ac(d¯ ∨ b), (3.4)
P̂Sb0 = b̄(āc ∨ b̄d)
Sb0

(0)
¯ P̂ (1) = cb̄ ∨ āc̄d.
¯
P̂Sb1 = bd ∨ dcā ∨ ab̄d¯ ∨ ac̄d,
Sb1

(3.5)

Different S-boxes are applied in the variants of Midori; for instance, Midori128
applies four different 8-bit S-boxes SSbi , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. To keep the involution property
of S-boxes, each output bit permutation is derived as the inverse of the corresponding
input bit permutation. The structure of Midori and the proposed fault diagnosis
schemes are presented in Fig. 3.1. This figure shows that four 8-bit outputs of these
S-boxes are taken of specific permutation order as shown in Fig. 3.1 (two of the
S-boxes are omitted for the sake of brevity). Through the comparison of actual and
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predicted parities, we have error indication flags for each Sb1 in S-boxes of SSbi
as shown in Fig. 3.1 (e0 − e7 ). Moreover, both aforementioned parity bits such as
single parity and interleaved parity bit have been utilized to create error indication
flags. Eventually, one can OR the flags to have a final error indication flag which
alters of any faults detected in SSbi .

Predicted signature

8 bits

Signaturebased
protected
Sb1

e6

e0

SSb3

Actual signature

8 bits

8 bits

Predicted signature
Signaturebased
protected
Sb1

Actual
signature

8 bits

Signaturebased
protected
Sb1

e1

Signaturebased
protected
Sb1

e7

SSb0

Figure 3.1: Derivation of the error indication flags for the S-boxes in Midori128.

Recomputing with Swapped Inputs (RESI):
We use the method of Recomputing with Swapped Inputs (RESI) as shown in Fig.
3.2 for Midori128 (part of the S-boxes block is shown for the sake of brevity). This
method is a subset to the approaches presented in [44]. In this approach, we have
swapped the inputs to the S-boxes Sb1 in each of the four 8-bit S-boxes SSbi , i.e.,
the first four inputs are asserted to the second S-box Sb1 and the next four-bit
inputs go to the first one as shown in Fig. 3.2. Then, if the output of each Sb1
is swapped, it gives the correct results. Finally, we compare the swapped outputs
with actual outputs to detect not only transient faults but also permanent faults.
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3.2 Fault Diagnosis of ShuffleCell and KeyAdd
It is noted that the order of permutation of inputs for each SSbi is different and
swapping would be specific for each of 8-bit S-boxes. In the proposed scheme which
is based on recomputations, we do not change the original algorithm; nevertheless,
we perform the recomputation for detecting the errors; thus, no change is made in
the original Midori computation and the overall structure for the original algorithm
is intact. Therefore, algorithmic security is not affected in the proposed method as
the datapath would use the output of the original Midori algorithm.
SSb3

SSb0

Sb1
8 bits

Sb1
8 bits

Sb1

8 bits

8 bits

Sb1

Figure 3.2: The proposed RESI scheme for Midori128.

3.2 Fault Diagnosis of ShuffleCell and KeyAdd
The signature derivation for fault detection in ShuffleCell, such as parity, would be
straightforward and can be realized free in hardware due to just rewiring of the
elements of 4 × 4 array state (for instance, parity of inputs is equal to parity of
outputs because re-wiring does not affect the computation of parities). We need
error detection mechanisms for ShuffleCell (an attacker may try to inject fault by
violating setup time for these paths); yet, through using signatures, e.g., parity or
interleaved parities, the predicted signatures are equal to the actual signatures of
the prior transformation, and that reduces the cost for error detection.
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The other operation, KeyAdd, consists of modulo-2 addition of the i-th n-bit round
key RKi with the state S. In this operation, the signature inputs, i.e., state and
round-key, are modulo-2 added to derive the signature of output for each round.
Suppose the output of KeyAdd is denoted by O and inputs are S and RKi , 0 ≤ i ≤
14 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 18 for Midori64 and Midori128, respectively. Denoting signatures
by “Sig.”, and the predicted signatures of, for instance, the output O which is the
ˆ (O) (S, RKi ), we have Sig.
ˆ (O) (S, RKi ) = Sig.(S) ⊕
function of two inputs by Sig.
Sig.(RKi ).

3.3 Proposed Design-for-Fault-Detection in
MixColumn
Let us denote the input state of MixColumn as S and the output state as S 0 . Then,
we have the following for this operation:
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(3.6)

s3 s7 s11 s15

where each element of input or output state matrix would be 4 bits and 8 bits for
Midori64 and Midori128, respectively.
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3.3 Proposed Design-for-Fault-Detection in MixColumn
In the two Midori variants, the linear layers consist of the two mentioned operations, ShuffleCell and MixColumn, that are applied over GF (24 ) and GF (28 ) for the
64-bit Midori and 128-bit Midori, respectively. As mentioned for the MixColumn
operation, Midori utilizes an involutive binary matrix M , as defined before. For the
matrix M , there could be, typically, three types of 4 × 4 matrices, i.e., involutive
MDS (MA ), non-involutive MDS (MB ), and involutive almost MDS (MC ) matrices
[14]:

MA =

1


2



6




2 6 4
1 4
4 1



6

,

2




4 6 2 1

MB =

2


1



1




3 1 1
2 3
1 2



1

,

3




3 1 1 2













MC =

0


1



1




1 1 1
0 1
1 0



1

.

1




(3.7)

1 1 1 0

Among these matrices, involutive almost MDS (MC ) has been applied more in various lightweight ciphers such as PRINCE due to its efficiency. Furthermore, MC has
low diffusion speed and small number of active S-boxes in each round and has led
to increase in the immunity against linear and non-linear attacks. In the proposed
fault detection schemes, the objective is to evaluate these three matrices to possibly
add a new aspect in how efficient these are when fault diagnosis approaches are used.
For this operation, we present three error detection schemes as detailed in the following.
Scheme 1 (Column Signatures): In the first scheme, we propose modulo-2 addition
of the state elements of each column of the output matrix (S 0 ). The theorem is
that the result is equal to modulo-2 addition of the state elements of each column
of the input matrix (S). Since, modulo-2 addition of each column of matrix M in
all of three types of matrices is equal to 0 10 , fault diagnosis through this approach
is efficiently performed for the three matrices. In general, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have
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s0i = mi s0 + mi+4 s1 + mi+8 s2 + mi+12 s3 .
Let us modulo-2 add the first column of the state output matrix as following:
s00 + s01 + s02 + s03 = (m0 + m1 + m2 + m3 )s0 + (m4 + m5 + m6 + m7 )s1
+(m8 + m9 + m10 + m11 )s2 + (m12 + m13 + m14 + m15 )s3 .

(3.8)

Moreover, one can derive that each of the coefficients of the input elements, e.g.,
m0 +m1 +m2 +m3 is equal to 0 10 . For example, in the case of MA and for Midori64 that
consists of 4-bit elements in the states, we have: {1}16 +{2}16 +{6}16 +{4}16 = {1}16 .
Consequently, modulo-2 addition of each of the output matrix columns is equal to
that of the columns of input matrix, i.e., s00 + s01 + s02 + s03 = s0 + s1 + s2 + s3 . For
both variants of Midori, one can derive four 4-bit (Midori64) or 8-bit (Midori128)
signatures which can eventually be compared with the actual ones to derive the
respective error indication flags.
Scheme 2 (Low-Overhead Union Signature): The second scheme is through modulo2 addition of all the elements of the output state (union signature), i.e.,
s00 + s01 + ... + s014 + s015 = (m0 + m1 + m2 + m3 )s0 + (m4 + m5 + m6 + m7 )s1
+(m8 + m9 + m10 + m11 )s2 + (m12 + m13 + m14 + m15 )s3 +
(m0 + m1 + m2 + m3 )s4 + ... + (m12 + m13 + m14 + m15 )s15 .
(3.9)
It is derived that each of these coefficients, e.g., m0 +m1 + m2 + m3 , is equal to 0 10
for the aforementioned matrices. As the proof, the binary values of the following
hex entries are all equal to 0 10 :
{1}16 + {2}16 + {6}16 + {4}16 = {0}16 + {1}16 + {1}16 + {1}16
= {2}16 + {1}16 + {1}16 + {3}16 = {1}16 .
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3.3 Proposed Design-for-Fault-Detection in MixColumn
Therefore, modulo-2 addition of all output elements in the state is equal to that of
all input elements in the state (as a nibble or a byte for Midori64 and Midori128,
respectively), i.e., Σsi = Σs0i ; where 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. In this approach, we have less
number of signatures that leads to lower overhead.
Scheme 3 (Interleaved Signatures): The third scheme is through predicting interleaved signatures. We prove that for each two random rows of MC this is a viable
approach whereas it is not a suitable scheme for the other two matrices presented
before. Let us, through an example, detail on this scheme. Let us modulo-2 add
two even-row elements of the state output state, i.e., rows 0 and 2, as s00 + s02 =
(m0 +m2 )s0 +(m4 +m6 )s1 +(m8 +m10 )s2 +(m12 +m14 )s3 and two odd-row elements,
i.e., rows 1 and 3, as s01 +s03 = (m1 +m3 )s0 +(m5 +m7 )s1 +(m9 +m11 )s2 +(m13 +m15 )s3 .
The derived results are two 4-bit or 8-bit predicted interleaved signatures in each
column. As computed for the matrices, just in the case of MC , the interleaved signatures for each column in the input and output states are equal. It is interesting
that modulo-2 addition of each two random rows of MC leads to coefficients of 0 10 in
the aforementioned discussions, e.g., modulo-2 addition of the first and third rows
of MC is equal to 0 10100 , proving s00 + s02 = s0 + s2 ; moreover, modulo-2 addition of
the second and fourth rows is 0 01010 and thus s01 + s03 = s1 + s3 . However, the two
other matrices, i.e., MA and MB , do not have this property.
Midori can utilize three 4 × 4 MDS matrices for the MixColumn transformation;
we have compared these three different variants to motivate that error detection
needs to be considered as a design factor. In other words, the inventors of Midori
have investigated the matrices used in MixColumn to reach the best efficiency for
Midori, when the structures have similar algorithmic security. Different categories
of the MixColumn transformations are designed based on a wide pool of criteria that
can be made smaller by considering the error detection criterion during the design.
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The fact that the proposed error detection scheme through interleaved signatures
is merely efficient for MC and the other two proposed schemes can efficiently be
applied to all three types of matrices in MixColumn further motivates the urgency
of having error detection as a design factor not an afterthought.

3.4 Proposed Approach for Key Schedule

As mentioned before, for both variants of Midori, a 128-bit secret key (K) is applied;
however, in the case of Midori64, the key is denoted as two 64-bit subkeys K0 and
K1 and the whitening key (W K) is derived through modulo-2 addition of these 64bit subkeys. In key schedule of Midori64, the round key is derived through RKi =
K(imod2) ⊕ αi , where 0 ≤ i ≤ 14; while in Midori128, W K = K and RKi = K ⊕ βi ,
0 ≤ i ≤ 18, in which βi = αi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 14. The constants are in the form of 4 × 4
binary matrices which are modulo-2 added to the LSB of the round key nibble in
Midori64 and round key byte in Midori128. Therefore, the signature of the round
key matrix is either intact (if round constant element is 0 00 ) or inverted (if round
ˆ i ) = Sig.(K) ⊕ Sig.(βi /αi ).
constant element is 0 10 ): Sig.(RK
For the sake of brevity, we go over α0 = β0 , α14 = β14 , and β18 and we do not analyze
all the matrices for the constant values; nonetheless, similar approaches can be used
for them:
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(3.11)

0 0 0 0

We present two examples for the error detection approach of round key operation.
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First, let us denote the input key as K and the output round key as RKi . Then, we
have the following for this operation in Midori128 with constant βi , where 0 ≤ i ≤ 18,
RKi = K ⊕ βi , and rkj , kj , and β j are the matrices entries for these states, and
each element of input or output key matrix would be 4 bits and 8 bits for Midori64
and Midori128, respectively.
In the first example, we derive 16 signatures, where, each signature is for the round
key elements, rkj = kj ⊕ β j where each kj is a nibble as kj3 kj2 kj1 kj0 for Midori64
or a byte as kj7 kj6 kj5 kj4 kj3 kj2 kj1 kj0 for Midori128. One signature is derived for each
ˆ j ) = Sig.(k 7 k 6 k 5 k 4 k 3 k 2 k 1 (k 0 ⊕ β j ));
element, for instance, for Midori128, Sig.(rk
j j j j j j j
j
where 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and we have intact or inverted elements of round key matrix.
The second scheme is based on modulo-2 addition of the entire elements in the state
matrix to create just one signature for error detection. We have one signature as
Sig.(rk) = Σkj + Σβ j , where 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. For instance, for the three matrices
α0 = β0 , α14 = β14 , and β18 in this scheme, we have the modulo-2 addition of all
elements of each matrices as 0 00 ,0 10 , and 0 00 , respectively. Therefore, for RK0 and
RK18 , the input signatures are intact; while, for RK14 , it is inverted.

3.5 Overall Presented Architecture
This chapter is finalized by presenting the overall structures of the presented error detection schemes. The mentioned error detection structures of encryption of
Midori128 which consists of 20 rounds with cell size of 8 bits is depicted in Fig.
3.3. The encryption function of this variant consists of the round function and key
generation in which the last round has just the SubCell operation and the whitening
key is modulo-2 added just in the first and the last steps. As seen in Fig. 3.3, we
have shown the respective sections in which we have proposed the error detection
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Figure 3.3: The proposed error detection architecture for Midori128.

schemes for different operations. The predicted signatures of each operation in round
function are illustrated in Fig. 3.3 as proposed in the aforementioned sections.

Moreover, the Midori’s encryption and decryption signature-based error detection
architectures are also presented in Fig. 3.3. As seen in this figure, the signatures
of the input and the key (“Sig.” Input and “Sig.” Key) are derived and processed
through a loop-like architecture, asserted to a MUX and register (shown in Fig. 3.4).
The encryption and decryption include similar operations except for the ShuffleCell
(Sh) operation in encryption that is replaced with InvShuffleCell (Sh−1 ) operation
for decryption. The error detection scheme for InvShuffleCell (Sh−1 ) operation can
be adopted based on the explanations in Section 3.2. Moreover, the key generation
process is changed in decryption as shown, i.e., L−1 (K) instead of K and the corresponding signatures “Sig.” (L−1 (K)) and “Sig.” (L), and, correspondingly, the i-th
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Error
detection
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Enc: Sig.(K)
Dec: Sig.(L1
(K))

Figure 3.4: Error detection architectures for the combined encryption/decryption
unit for Midori128.
round constant is replaced by L−1 (β18−i ) instead of βi , in Fig. 3.4.
We would like to emphasize that the granularity at which the comparisons between
the generated and the predicted signatures are to be made has direct effects on reliability, false alarm resiliency, and overhead of both performance and implementation
metrics. Let us go over three cases: (a) One can choose to have the check points
for the entire encryption/decryption by deriving a “black-box” signature for these
processes. In such a case, we have less overhead at the expense of possibility of
encountering masking for the error indication flags. The false alarm ratios though
are the lowest for this case, as we do not use fine-tuned multiple signatures, (b)
one may use the error indication flags of the transformations separately, where the
formulations presented in this thesis are used for each of the check points. In such
a scheme, error coverage is higher at the expense of more overhead, and the possibility of false alarms, (c) finally, one may choose to have finer granularity, where
each of the 4-bit S-boxes of the Midori’s 8-bit S-box are checked separately (or, for
instance, the columns of the MixColumn transformation are checked individually).
At the expense of higher overhead and with higher error coverage, such a scheme
may lead to higher false alarms ratios.
To finalize this section, let us provide three examples on the usage models of different signatures. Simple parity codes are capable of detecting odd faults, including
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single stuck-at faults which are the ideal cases for fault attacks. Nevertheless, their
effectiveness could be limited if fault attacks are mounted intelligently to circumvent such protections. Moreover, VLSI defects could result in burst faults whose
detection is not possible through such signatures. Burst faults, e.g., adjacent faults,
are detected through interleaved parties at the expense of more overhead. A third
usage model would be contrasting the signature-based diagnosis approach, which
uses linear codes that can (always) detect random errors of small multiplicity (and
can never detect some other errors) which is diverse from an architecture based on
robust codes which can detect (with probability) any error. These two solutions
have two different goals, the first gives reliability and the second gives hardware
security (against fault attacks).

3.6 Proposed Approaches in Presence of Biased Fault
Attacks
A subset of fault attacks, differential fault intensity analysis (DFIA), see for instance,
[45]-[47] , combines the idea of differential power analysis with fault injection
principles to obtain biased fault models; whose merit is that same fault in both the
original and redundant computations can be injected, more practically, where not all
faults occur with equal probability. Practically, the attacker is interested in using as
few faults as possible (preferably single faults with different intensities), to reduce the
effort. Previous work argue that the single-bit (more likely in low fault intensity),
two-bit, three-bit, and four-bit (more likely in higher intensities) biased fault models
can be used to simulate variation of fault intensity. In addition, fault categories
presented in [47]-[48] include: Single Bit Upset (SBU), Single Byte Double Bit
Upset (SBDBU), Single Byte Triple Bit Upset (SBTBU), Single Byte
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Quadruple Bit Upset (SBQBU), Other Single Byte Faults (OSB), and Multiple Byte
Faults (MB); the former four corresponding to single/two/three/four-bit models.
The proposed approaches in this thesis based on error detecting codes, column signatures, and RESI are able to thwart a number of such fault models. Specifically,
SBUs and SBTBUs are detected fully through the approaches based on error detecting codes and column signatures, using parities. Moreover, through interleaved
parities, in addition to burst faults, some SBTBUs, SBQBUs, OSBs, and MBs are
detected. Error detecting codes and column signatures (parities) can also detect
OSBs and MBs, detailed in the next chapter through simulations. Furthermore,
RESI can detect errors with relatively-high error coverage, presented in the next
chapter.
Multi-byte faults cannot be used practically for attacking time redundancy countermeasure implementations, e.g., RESI, and single-byte fault models are the only
viable option for the attackers [47]. We note that, however, the presented countermeasures based on RESI could fail to detect the occurrence of a fault as long as the
adversary could inject the same fault in both the original and redundant computations (biased fault model makes it easier). The proposed RESI architecture (see
Fig. 3.2) can be used in conjunction with encoding schemes which nullify the effect
of the bias in the fault model by fault space transformation (if two equivalent faults
f0 and f1 are injected in the output registers, we use a mapping that transforms the
fault space), thwarting both these attack schemes, similar the schemes used in [47].
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4 Error Injection Simulations and
Implementations through FPGA

The error coverage assessment and overhead benchmark of the error detection structures are presented in this chapter. The performed simulation results show high error
coverage (the percent of ratio of number of detected errors and the number of injected faults) for the presented schemes. Using the proposed approaches, the error
detection structures are capable of detecting the injected faults with high coverage
(transient and permanent as well as single, multiple, and adjacent faults). We note
that permanent faults, e.g, stuck at faults are caused by VLSI manufacturing defects (and of course if the intention is to break the entire device, such faults can be
injected at run-time). There are well established automatic test pattern generation
(ATPG)-based testing techniques to identify these faults . On the other hand, “long
transient faults” can lead to information leakage . Simple time redundancy cannot
detect long transient faults that last for the normal computation and recomputation,
and attackers have successfully injected long transient faults to break this countermeasure . Through field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementations using
Xilinx Virtex-7 family, it is shown that the overheads of the proposed architectures
are acceptable for resource-constrained applications.
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4.1 Error coverage

The performed simulation results show high error coverage (the percent of ratio
of number of detected errors and the number of injected faults) for the presented
schemes. Using the proposed approaches, the error detection structures are capable
of detecting the injected faults with high coverage (transient and permanent as well
as single, multiple, and adjacent faults). We note that permanent faults, e.g., stuck
at faults are caused by VLSI manufacturing defects (and of course if the intention is
to break the entire device, such faults can be injected at run-time). There are well
established automatic test pattern generation (ATPG)-based testing techniques to
identify these faults. On the other hand, “long transient faults” can lead to information leakage. Simple time redundancy cannot detect long transient faults that
last for the normal computation and recomputation, and attackers have successfully
injected long transient faults to break this countermeasure. Through FPGA implementations using Xilinx Virtex-7 family, it is shown that the overheads of the
proposed architectures are acceptable for resource-constrained applications. Most
internal faults are modeled by transient random faults. By relying on simulations,
error coverage through multiple stuck-at fault injections is evaluated for the Midori.
The results of our performed simulations are for both transient faults and permanent
internal faults. We consider both single and multiple stuck-at faults because these
model both natural and malicious faults (the reason is that natural faults are usually
multiple, and although single stuck-at faults are the ideal cases for the attackers, due
to technological constraints, multiple faults occur in reality). The single-bit errors in
the nibbles (Midori64) or bytes (Midori128) occurring at the outputs of the linear or
nonlinear components of Midori are detected by the presented signature-based error
detection approaches. The error coverage of the proposed schemes for these single
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stuck-at faults is 100%; therefore, no simulation is required for these cases. The
analytic reason is that odd faults are detected using the proposed approaches, as
the inherent property of the signatures used, and single stuck-at faults is its subset.
We anticipate that the proposed approaches would not detect all of the potential
fault attacks but the proposed architectures would make it more difficult to mount,
e.g., analytically, more than 99.99% of the faults injected are detected. The reason
is that multiple signatures are used for different sub-parts of the architectures which
alarm the errors (the error coverage of interleaved parity, for instance, considering
different transformations and rounds is: 100 × (1 − (0.5)2m )%, where m is the total
number of use cases).

The results of our performed simulations are for both transient faults and permanent
internal faults. Midori128 encryption has been considered as reference for the faultinjection simulations. Through applying two fault injection experiments, i.e., 10,000
and 100,000 faults (diverse in terms of the type of the fault, its location, and its
count), error indication flags are monitored, and the detected errors are counted
for the encryption operation. The results of the performed simulations in Table 4.1
show that as the number of injection points is increased, higher error coverage is
obtained. We would like to note two points on our experiment methods; (a) we
have used linear-feedback shift registers (LFSRs) to inject the faults, when random
multiple faults are required, where the location, the type, and the number of faults
are chosen by LFSRs with maximum tap polynomials. (b) Starting with injecting
10,000 faults using such a method and through LFSRs for different assertions of the
inputs, we have increased the number of injections to get closer to more realistic error
coverages. This has been done up to 100,000 injections using the aforementioned
method and as seen in Table 4.1, the change in the error coverage, although slight,
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Table 4.1: Error coverage of the proposed schemes for Midori128
Type of faults
Stuck-at zero
Stuck-at one

Injected faults
10,000
100,000
10,000
100,000

Detected faults
9,910
99,890
9,909
99,782

Error coverage
99.10%
99.89%
99.09%
99.78%

Table 4.2: FPGA implementation results for the original Midori128 encryption and
its proposed error detection scheme on Virtex-7 FPGA for xc7vx330t
Architecture
Midori128 (LUT-based)
Signature-based error
detection for LUTs
Midori128 (logic-based)
Signature-based error
detection for logic-based

Area
(occupied slices)
155
161 (3.9%)
157
171 (8.9%)

Delay (ns) /
Frequency (MHz)
2.70 (370.37)
2.81 (4.07%)
(355.87)
2.79 (358.42)
3.01 (7.88%)
(332.22)

Power
(mW)
340
367
(7.9%)
349
396
(13.5%)

Throughput
(Gbps)
47.41
45.55 (3.9%)
45.88
42.52 (7.3%)

Efficiency
(Mbps/slices)
305.9
282.9
(7.5%)
292.2
248.6
(14.9%)

hints to what we realistically would get through exhaustive search.
Midori’s S-boxes and MixColumn operations consume much of the area and power
consumption of the block cipher (compared to ShuffleCell and KeyAdd). Therefore, these are the prominent operations for protecting against injected faults. We
have presented in this thesis three schemes for each of these operations, i.e., parity/interleaved parity/swapping the inputs for the S-boxes, and element-wise, columnwise, and matrix-wise signatures for MixColumn. Alleviating the error coverage of
Midori can be performed through using the schemes with higher error coverage, i.e.,
swapping the inputs for the S-boxes combined with the element-wise error detection approach for MixColumn, at the expense of higher overhead incurred. Such
an improvement would be a compromise between the reliability requirements and
overhead tolerance.

4.2 Implementation Results
The results of the FPGA overhead assessments of our proposed schemes are pre-
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sented in this section. Through this benchmarking, the overheads (degradation)
are derived for various metrics of the presented schemes. The ISE version 14.7 and
Virtex-7 FPGA family (device: xc7vx330t) have been utilized for the FPGA implementations. VHDL has been used as the design entry for the original and the error
detection structures. As seen in Fig. 4.1, we have also shown the structure of the
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Figure 4.1: The structure of Midori128 8-input S-box implemented using Virtex-7
6-input LUTs.
8-input S-box of Midori128 using 6-input LUTs (6LUT in Fig. 4.1) and multiplexers
(MUXs), leading to 32 of 6LUTs.
We present the results for two of the proposed schemes in this thesis tabulated in
Table 4.2. Based on the simulation results in this section, these overheads are added
for the error coverage of very close to 100%. The proposed fault diagnosis approaches
provide high error coverage at the expense of acceptable overheads, making the
hardware architectures of Midori more reliable. We would like to emphasize that it
is expected to have similar overheads for other FPGA families and also the designs
on application-specific i ntegrated circuit (ASIC).
We finalize this section by investigating differential fault attacks on a similar lightweight
block cipher to Midori, PRESENT, to study potential fault attacks on this cipher as
well. It is noted that many prior works have been done on fault attacks of standardized ciphers such as the AES and the DES [49]-[51]. In such attacks on lightweight
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ciphers like PRESENT, the attacker compares the correct ciphertext and the faulty
one (caused by faulty operation) to obtain the secret key [52]. Mounting such attacks can be based on single-bit faults, single-nibble faults, or multiple-nibble faults
which are adopted into the key schedule algorithm during the encryption operation.
According to such attacks on PRESENT with SPN structure (or even for the functions in CLEFIA which is a Feistel network), potential attacks on Midori variants
can be mounted (which have round-based architectures similar to PRESENT), to
recover the subkeys in the rounds [14], [52]-[54]. In differential fault attacks, the
attackers try to inject the faulty nibble in a specific r ound i n o rder t o d iscover the
secret key by examining a group of correct and faulty ciphertexts. After that, the attack is based on solving a number of fault equations which are obtained through the
propagation of the injected faults through the remainder of the encryption structure. We anticipate that differential fault attacks, similarly, can be mounted on
Midori. Finally, we would like to note that Midori (and other block ciphers) include
controller architectures when practically implemented. Such control blocks are also
susceptible to natural and malicious faults, see, for instance, [55], and the remedies
proposed based on programmable state flipflops.
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In this thesis, we have presented new error detection schemes for low-energy block
ciphers such as Midori. This would be an add-on to the work of our research group
on reliability and cryptographic engineering [56]-[101]. To sum up, this thesis
presents for the first time, the fault diagnosis approaches for the energy-efficient,
lightweight block cipher Midori. For the S-boxes within Midori, we have derived and
implemented both LUT-based and logic gate variants, and proposed fault diagnosis
schemes that can be tailored based on the reliability and overheard objectives. The
MixColumn operation has been examined to achieve a number of schemes, and the
selection of the matrices within has been carefully done to have low-overhead
detection approaches.
Through FPGA implementations using Xilinx Virtex-7 family, it has been shown
that the overheads of the proposed architectures are acceptable for resource-constrained
applications. We have also presented sketches of possible fault attacks as the motivation to the presented work as well as biased faults considerations, Virtex-7 specific
implementation of Midori128 S-boxes, and usage models for three select signatures.
More reliable architectures for Midori are achieved through the proposed detection
schemes and they can be tailored based on the objectives in terms of reliability and
overhead tolerance.
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5.1 Future Works
In this thesis, the proposed schemes are based on signature approach and swapping
inputs unlike the traditional time and space redundancy countermeasures to meet
the main purpose of this work. The main objective of this thesis is towards achieving
a low-area and low-power consuming architecture for lightweight ciphers along with
roughly 100% fault detection.
One future scope which can be helpful for this work is that one could analyze
combined power and fault analysis attack resiliency. Efficiently-maskable approaches
provide viable solutions for considering thwarting power analysis attacks before the
design phase.
Countermeasures based on recomputations could fail to detect the occurrence of a
fault as long as the adversary could inject the same fault in both the original and
redundant computations (biased fault model makes it easier). The countermeasures
based on recomputations can be used in conjunction with encoding schemes which
nullify the effect of the bias in the fault model by fault space transformation (if two
equivalent faults f0 and f1 are injected in the output registers, we use a mapping
that transforms the fault space), thwarting both these attack schemes, similar the
schemes used in [48].
During the implementation, type of used platform which determines the hardware
fabric that will be utilized for implementation, is considered as a significant factor
for deeply-embedded systems.. These proposed schemes for this cipher were implemented on Virtex FPGA families. However, the proposed design can be implemented
on other FPGA families and the results can be benchmarked. Similarly, compared to
an FPGA, implementations on ASIC platforms might be suitable in terms of area
and power optimizations for some applications. Therefore, ASIC implementation
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can be the next part of the proposed work.
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